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PUTTING THE CAT BACK IN THE BAG: INVOLUNTARY 
CONFESSIONS AND SELF-INCRIMINATION 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Guilford1 
(decided June 4, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case note addresses the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary confessions, analyzing their admissibility against de-
fendants based on the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.2  Protection against officially compelled self-incrimination is 
found in the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment and its 
New York State equivalent.3  This case note discusses what consti-
tutes wrongful custodial interrogation and official coercion, drawing 
distinctions between voluntary confessions and involuntary confes-
sions.  This case note also examines the extent and limits of Fifth 
Amendment protection offered to criminal defendants by the land-
mark case Miranda v. Arizona4 and its progeny.  Through analyses of 
both the developmental history and case law precedent behind the test 
for admitting confessions, this case note determines that the holding 
of the court in People v. Guilford comports with the spirit of the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, thus, affording the de-
fendant the constitutional protection guaranteed under it. 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In People v. Guilford, the defendant, James E. Guilford, was 
 
1 991 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in pertinent part: “no person…shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”); N.Y. CONST. Art. I, §6 (stating in pertinent 
part that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against him-
self or herself”). 
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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taken into police custody on the evening of March 20, 2007, on the 
suspicion of murdering his mistress, Sharon Nugent.5  The defendant 
was read his Miranda rights and was confined in a windowless, 
clock-less, sparsely furnished interrogation room.6  Aside from es-
corted bathroom breaks, the defendant remained in this room for for-
ty-nine and one-half hours.7  During his interrogation, the defendant 
was denied food and rest, while relay teams of investigators took pe-
riodic breaks in between rounds of questioning.8 
On the evening of March 21, 2007, the defendant made the 
statement, “[O]nly me, God, and Sharon know what happened to 
her.”9  The following evening, the defendant stated that he would 
“give everyone what they want,” so long as he could confer with the 
District Attorney and have an attorney of his own present.10  Addi-
tionally, investigators promised the defendant that he would be given 
a deal for a lighter sentence if he disclosed the location of the vic-
tim’s body.11  As promised, counsel for the defendant arrived on the 
evening of March 22.12  Counsel, however, was never told of how 
long the interrogation had lasted up to that point.13 
The defendant’s forty-nine and one half hour interrogation 
ended eight hours prior to his confession.14  With his counsel present, 
the defendant’s interrogation concluded at 1:30 a.m. on March 23.15  
It was only at that point that the defendant was formally arrested.16  
The defendant was then allowed an eight hour rest before his ar-
raignment at 9:30 a.m. that morning.17  Two hours later, at 11:30 
a.m., the defendant confessed to the murder and stated to investiga-
tors, “I killed her.”18  A later search of the location said to contain the 
victim’s remains was fruitless and, subsequently, the defendant’s case 
 
5 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 205. 
6 Id. at 207. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 207. 
11 Id. at 208. 
12 Id. at 207-8. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 209. 
15 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 208. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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went to trial.19  Based on the confession made on March 23, the de-
fendant was convicted of murder in Onondaga County Court.20 
On appeal, the defendant argued that his confession was in-
admissible because not only was his interrogation wrongful, but also 
there was no “pronounced break” in time between his interrogation 
and confession.21  The Appellate Division, Fourth Department af-
firmed, holding that the gap in time between the conclusion of the in-
terrogation and the confession was sufficient to restore the defend-
ant’s state of mind to that of someone who had not been 
interrogated.22  After that decision, the defendant further appealed to 
the New York State Court of Appeals, where the Appellate Divi-
sion’s decision was reversed and a new trial was ordered in accord-
ance with that decision.23 
The defendant was in police custody for the duration of his in-
terrogation; during this time, officials deprived the defendant of es-
sential human needs like food and rest, thereby, placing the defendant 
under the influence of official coercion and, thus, his interrogation 
was wrongful.24  After it was established that a wrongful interroga-
tion had occurred, the court decided whether the defendant’s confes-
sion was voluntary.25  To make this determination, the court consid-
ered whether the eight hours elapsed between the end of the 
defendant’s interrogation and his confession was enough time to 
purge his mind of the influence of the wrongful questioning.26  The 
court followed New York State and federal precedent by examining 
the “totality of the circumstances” leading up to the defendant’s con-
fession.27  The court determined that the eight-hour break was insuf-
ficient to distinguish the interrogation and confession as two distinct 
events.28  As a result, the court ruled that the defendant’s confession 
on March 23 was inadmissible at trial because it was involuntarily 
made while he was still under the influence of official coercion from 
 
19 Id. 
20 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 208. 
21 Id. at 205. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 207. 
25 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206. 
26 Id. at 209. 
27 Id. at 206. 
28 Id. at 209-10. 
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the wrongful interrogation.29 
III. ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PRECEDENT FOLLOWED BY THE 
COURT 
A. Voluntariness 
In reaching its decision, the court in Guilford cited the United 
States Supreme Court case Ashcraft v. Tennessee.30  In Ashcraft, the 
Court reasoned that interrogation techniques, like lengthy questioning 
without rest for the suspect, may constitute elements of a wrongful 
interrogation.31  The Court further decided that the use of these tech-
niques by officials to bring about a confession constituted official co-
ercion.32 
In Ashcraft, the defendant was charged with the murder of his 
wife.33  The facts in Ashcraft were conflicted as to the defendant’s 
exact treatment during the interrogation, but it was uncontroverted 
that he had been interrogated for thirty-six hours without rest.34  In 
addition, there was conjecture as to whether an incriminating state-
ment was made.35  In Ashcraft, the Court recognized that regardless 
of whether a confession was made, the interrogation was wrongful 
because of the length of time the interrogation continued without a 
break.36  The Court held that any statements made by the defendant 
were involuntary and could not be used against him.37  The court in 
Guilford relied on Ashcraft in its decision, reasoning that that the de-
fendant, like the defendant in Ashcraft, had been subjected to a 
wrongful interrogation because of his forty-nine and one-half hour 
interrogation without rest.38  Because the interrogation was found to 
be wrongful, the court in Guilford next turned to the issue of volun-
tariness. 
 
29 Id. at 209. 
30 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
31 Id. at 155. 
32 Id. at 153. 
33 Id. at 148. 
34 Id. at 149. 
35 Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 151-52. 
36 Id. at 154. 
37 Id. 
38 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 208. 
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B. The “Totality of the Circumstances” Test 
To determine the issue of voluntariness, the court in Guilford 
turned to the United States Supreme Court case Clewis v. Texas.39  
The Court found that the “totality of the circumstances” was the ap-
propriate test to assess whether a confession made after, or during, a 
wrongful interrogation was voluntary or involuntary.40  In Clewis, the 
defendant was charged with murder.41  He was held for nine days and 
was deprived of sufficient food, sleep, and visits from family and 
counsel.42  The defendant made three confessions on three separate 
days during his nine day interrogation.43  The Court reasoned that the 
defendant’s interrogation was wrongful because of its length and be-
cause the defendant was not given adequate rest between the periods 
of questioning.44  As a result, the Court found that the interrogation 
and confession were part of one continuous ordeal for the defendant 
rather than separate and distinct events.45  Given the “totality of the 
circumstances,” the Court held that the defendant in Clewis was still 
under the influence of official coercion when he signed his final 
statement, and it was, therefore, not given voluntarily.46 
The court in Guilford applied “the totality of the circumstanc-
es” test to the defendant’s confession.47  The court determined that 
although the defendant had been given a chance to rest after the end 
of his interrogation at 1:30 a.m., the time between then and his con-
fession at 11:30 a.m. was not sufficient to distinguish the two events 
from one another.48  In making that decision, the court considered the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s previous forty-nine and 
one-half hour interrogation.49  The court reasoned that given the 
length of his prior interrogation, the eight hour break was inadequate 
to purge the influence of official coercion from the defendant’s mind 
 
39 386 U.S. 707 (1967). 
40 Id. at 708; see Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957) (holding the “totality of the 
circumstances” must be assessed to reach a determination of the voluntariness of a confes-
sion). 
41 Clewis, 386 U.S. at 707. 
42 Id. at 709-10. 
43 Id. at 710. 
44 Id. at 711. 
45 Id. 
46 Clewis, 386 U.S. at 711. 
47 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 209. 
48 Id. at 207. 
49 Id. at 208. 
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at the time of his confession.50  The court reasoned that “the break” 
allotted to the defendant may have further weakened his mental con-
dition by prolonging his time in custody.51 
The United States Supreme Court offered a different view in 
Oregon v. Elstad.52  In Elstad, the Court held that absent actual coer-
cion, i.e., physical compulsion, late Miranda warnings are sufficient 
to dissipate the influence of a prior wrongful interrogation and subse-
quent confession.53  However, the facts of Guilford were distin-
guished from Elstad by the court.54 
The defendant in Elstad confessed at his home before he had 
been formally arrested or given his Miranda rights.55  It was only lat-
er, at the sheriff’s headquarters, that Miranda rights were adminis-
tered.56  Afterwards, a second confession was given.57  The Court 
held that the first confession did not adversely affect the defendant’s 
mind so as to render the second confession involuntary because there 
was never any actual coercion.58  In Guilford, the defendant was sub-
jected to actual coercion and was given a prompt Miranda warning.59  
In contrast to Elstad, the court in Guilford held that given the totality 
of the circumstances, these factors did not weigh as heavily and were 
deemed inadequate to dissipate the influence of the wrongful interro-
gation.60 
C. Miranda’s Limits 
The Court in Miranda explained that one of the safeguards to 
a defendant’s right against self-incrimination was the presence of 
counsel.61  Based on that rationale, any confession made in the pres-
 
50 Id. at 209. 
51 Id.  
52 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
53 Id. at 311-12. 
54 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206. 
55 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 311-12; see United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947) (stating that “after 
an accused has once ‘let the cat out of the bag’ by confessing, no matter what the induce-
ment, he is never thereafter free of psychological and practical disadvantages of having con-
fessed.”). 
59 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206. 
60 Id. at 210. 
61 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466. 
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ence of counsel would be considered voluntary.  In Guilford, the 
court decided that the presence of counsel did not “neutraliz[e] the 
effects of extensive coercive interrogation.”62  The court came to its 
conclusion, in part, because investigators had “made a deal” with the 
defendant to disclose the location of the victim’s body in exchange 
for allowing him the assistance of counsel.63  The court reasoned that 
when the defendant gave his confession, he was influenced by the co-
ercive deal made by investigators.64  Further influencing the court’s 
decision, counsel for the defendant was appointed well after his inter-
rogation had been underway.65  Counsel was not fully aware of the 
duration of the defendant’s interrogation and was mistrusted by the 
defendant; thus, based on Miranda, the defendant’s confession could 
not be considered voluntary.66 
IV. ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK PRECEDENT FOLLOWED BY THE 
COURT 
A. Chapple-Bethea Doctrine 
The court in Guilford applied the New York State Chapple-
Bethea Doctrine in its analysis.
 67  This doctrine was forged out of the 
consolidation of the holdings of two New York Court of Appeals 
cases: People v. Chapple68 and People v. Bethea.69  In Chapple, the 
court reasoned that the coercive effects of a wrongful interrogation 
must be neutralized in the mind of the defendant before he is able to 
give a voluntary confession.70  The court decided that in order for a 
wrongful interrogation’s influence to wear off, there must be a “pro-
nounced break” between questioning and confession.71  The defend-
ant in Chapple was walking alongside a highway at night when he 
was approached and questioned by a police officer regarding a recent 
 
62 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 210. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206. 
68 341 N.E.2d 243 (N.Y. 1975). 
69 493 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1986). 
70 Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 245-46; see People v. Paulman, 833 N.E.2d 239, 245 (N.Y. 
2005) (finding that the defendant’s confession was voluntary because he was not in custody 
at the time nor were his statements coaxed through wrongful means by the authorities). 
71 Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 245-46. 
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burglary.72  He was taken to the scene of the burglary and confessed 
to the crime.73  The defendant was then immediately brought to the 
police station, read his rights and reiterated his false confession.74
 
 
The defendant stated that he confessed to a crime that he was inno-
cent of out of fear because an officer threatened him with physical 
force.75  The court held that, in this instance, a late Miranda warning 
was an inadequate means of safeguarding the defendant’s rights.76  
Because there was no “pronounced break” in time between the initial 
interrogation and the second confession, the influence of the official 
coercion and initial confession was not removed from the defendant’s 
mind.77 
Likewise, in Bethea, the court held that statements made by 
the defendant while he was being transported to the police station 
were made involuntarily.78  The court explained that the proximity in 
time between the defendant’s initial statements in the police car, be-
fore his rights were administered, and the statements made at the sta-
tion, after his rights were read, was too close to remove the influence 
of the “premature” confession from his mind.79  The court in Bethea 
found that there was a continuous sequence of events extending from 
the arrest to the defendant’s uninformed confession in the police car 
and his second informed confession in the police station.80  For that 
reason, the court held that the defendant’s mind was never able to 
“reset” after his first uninformed confession and, thus, both confes-
sions were suppressed.81  In Guilford, although the Miranda warning 
was given prior to the interrogation, the court reasoned that the eight 
hour break in time between the coercive interrogation and the confes-
sion was not a “pronounced break.”82  As a result, there was insuffi-
cient time to remove the wrongful interrogation’s undue influence 
from the defendant’s mind.83  Under the Chappel-Bethea doctrine, the 
 
72 Id. at 244. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 245. 
76 Chapple, 341 N.E.2d at 245. 
77 Id. at 246. 
78 Bethea, 493 N.E.2d at 939. 
79 Id. at 938-39. 
80 Id. at 939. 
81 Id. 
82 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 209. 
83 Id. 
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defendant’s confession was not considered voluntary because there 
was never a “pronounced break” between his initial interrogation and 
subsequent confession that could have reset his mental condition to 
that of one not subjected to a wrongful confession.84 
B. Voluntariness Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
In assessing the applicable standard of proof, the court in 
Guilford applied the New York State Court of Appeals case People v. 
Anderson.85  In Anderson, the court held that the People bear the bur-
den to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of any con-
fession made by the defendant.86  The defendant in Anderson was 
held for nineteen hours while he was questioned about a friend’s 
murder.87  During his interrogation, the defendant was questioned in 
relays by investigators and eventually confessed after he was de-
prived of sleep and food.88  The defendant’s confession in Anderson 
was suppressed at trial because the People failed to show that the 
confession was given voluntarily.89  Another case discussed by the 
court on this point was People v. Valerius.90  Here, the New York 
Court of Appeals held that because the People failed to produce evi-
dence to the contrary of the defendant’s allegations that the confes-
sion was coerced by means of physical and mental abuse, the People 
failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, the defend-
ant’s confession was excluded as involuntary.91  In Guilford, the 
court reasoned that the People had failed to meet its burden because 
doubt remained as to whether the influence of the wrongful interroga-
tion remained in the mind of the defendant as he gave his confes-
sion.92 
 
84 Id. at 206, 209. 
85 364 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y. 1977). 
86 Id. at 1320. 
87 Id. at 1321. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1322. 
90 286 N.E.2d 254 (N.Y. 1972) 
91 Id. at 256. 
92 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 206, 210; see People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1965) 
(holding that before a confession may be submitted to the jury, the judge must determine its 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and that if the prosecutor desires to offer the con-
fession as evidence at the trial, the defense should be provided notice; conversely, if the de-
fense intends to contest the voluntariness of the confession was involuntary, notice shall be 
given to the prosecutor so that a pre-trial Huntley hearing may be held on the matter). 
9
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The court in Guilford appropriately held that the People did 
not prove its burden beyond a reasonable doubt as to the voluntari-
ness of the defendant’s confession.93  When taking into consideration 
the totality of the circumstances, the eight hour break between the 
end of the interrogation and the defendant’s confession was clearly 
not a “pronounced break” that would allow for differentiation be-
tween the wrongful forty-nine and one-half hour interrogation and the 
defendant’s confession eight hours later.94  The argument that the 
presence of counsel and the timely administration of Miranda warn-
ings are sufficient means to render the defendant’s confession volun-
tary is inadequate given that the defendant’s mind had already been 
influenced by the time counsel arrived.95  Moreover, the mere pres-
ence of counsel is not enough to guarantee a defendant’s right against 
self-incrimination, especially if counsel is not trusted by his client 
and lacks important details of the situation.96  The court’s holding, 
therefore, lends further support to preserving defendant’s rights 
against self-incrimination. 
V. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY 
The self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects criminal suspects from official compulsion designed to compel 
an incriminating statement that could be used against them.97  Begin-
ning with the United States Supreme Court case Bram v. United 
States,98 early American case law held that distinguishing whether a 
confession was voluntary or involuntary was the test to determine its 
admissibility into evidence.99  The Court found that statements used 
to convict the defendant in Bram were attained by confusing the de-
fendant rather than by the defendant’s own volition.100  Thus, the 
Court held that the confession was involuntary and in violation of the 
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment because the de-
 
93 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 210. 
94 Id. at 210. 
95 Id. at 208. 
96 Id. 
97 U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating in pertinent part that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”). 
98 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
99 Id. at 564. 
100 Id. at 562 (stating that the witness could not have seen the defendant commit the crime 
from the vantage point the witness claims to have been at). 
10
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fendant had been compelled into being a witness against himself.101 
Not all scholars agree that the foundation for the admissibility 
of a confession is rooted in the concept of voluntariness found in the 
Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.  One commentator dis-
agreed with the proposition that the defendant’s volition should be 
the test for admissibility of confessions and criticized the decision of 
the Court in Bram in his article Rethinking the Involuntary Confes-
sion Rule.102  In this article, the author argued that the requirement for 
voluntariness is not found in the self-incrimination clause.103  He 
opined that a test based in voluntariness is unworkable due to the im-
possibility of accurately determining a defendant’s state of mind.104  
Instead, the author advocated for a new workable test for identifying 
compelled confessions on a case-by-case basis based on the conduct 
of the interrogator.105  This test is based on the prohibition of compul-
sion found in the self-incrimination clause.106  The proposed test is an 
“objective penalty” standard, which measures compulsion based on 
whether an official has “impose[d] a penalty on a suspect to either 
punish silence or provoke speech.”107  Currently, no such test has 
been implemented by case law and, as such, the “objective penalty” 
standard remains a novel take on determining the admissibility of a 
confession. 
The next major judicial development of the self-incrimination 
clause came in the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona.108  In Miranda, 
the Court found that when a suspect is taken into custody and ques-
tioned, he must be procedurally informed of his rights by way of a set 
of prophylactic warnings; these procedural safeguards are now popu-
larly known as Miranda warnings.109  This case illustrated a shift in 
 
101 Id. at 564. 
102 Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Towards A Workable 
Test For Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 467, 515 (2005) (stating 
in pertinent part that an objective measurement of compulsion rather than a subjective meas-
urement of voluntariness is the proper test to determine the admissibility of a confession). 
103 Id. at 471. 
104 Id. at 468-69. 
105 Id. at 515. 
106 Id. at 538. 
107 Godsey, supra note 102, at 515-16. 
108 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436. 
109 Id. at 479 (stating that the defendant has a “right to remain silent, that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, 
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
ing if he so desires.”). 
11
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the Court’s emphasis in Bram from a test based solely on voluntari-
ness to a test based on in part on voluntariness and compulsion when 
considering the admissibility of a confession.110 
Following the wake of Miranda, Congress passed Section 
3501 in Title 18 of the United States Code.111  This statute concerned 
the admissibility of confessions, but omitted any references to Mi-
randa warnings as a means to determine admissibility.112  Instead, the 
statute emphasized voluntariness alone, as opposed to compulsion, as 
the deciding factor concerning the admissibility of a confession and 
removed any aspect of compulsion from the analysis.113 
The next major development in case law concerning the ad-
missibility of a confession arose in 2000 in the United States Su-
preme Court case Dickerson v. United States.114  In this case, the 
Court held that Miranda was constitutionally based and, thus, could 
not be superseded by a legislative act.115  This decision effectively 
overruled Section 3501, re-establishing Miranda warnings as a de-
fendant’s primary safeguard against coaxed or coerced confessions.116  
Therefore, the current applicable rule to determine the admissibility 
of a confession could be summarized as being rooted in the self-
incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, which in turn is rein-
forced by the decision in Miranda and enforced in practice by the 
administration of Miranda warnings to those in custody. 
VI. FEDERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The federal precedent leading up to this modern rule can be 
highlighted by a number of significant United States Supreme Court 
cases.  With regard to physical coercion, the United States Supreme 
Court decided, in Brown v. State of Mississippi,117 that no physical 
coercion is permitted to elicit a defendant’s confession.118  In this 
case, the only evidence against the defendants was their confes-
 
110 Godsey, supra note 102, at 501. 
111 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2013). 
112 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b). 
113 Id. 
114 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
115 Id. at 444. 
116 Id. 
117 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
118 Id. at 287. 
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sions.119  Further, it was undisputed that these confessions were ob-
tained after what could only be described as torture by the authori-
ties.120  The Court’s rationale in this case was that these confessions 
obtained by physical coercion could not be considered voluntary con-
fessions.121 
As to the mental state of the defendant, the United States Su-
preme Court quipped in the case United States v. Bayer122 that once 
the defendant “let the cat out of the bag,” he could not get it back 
in.123  This colorful comment pertains to the defendant’s mental state 
after he has given an initial involuntary confession followed by a se-
cond confession which on its face seemed voluntary.  The Court, 
however, does not preclude the admission of a confession made by 
the same defendant if his original “pre-confession” mental state had 
been restored.124  In contrast to Guilford, the Court reasoned in Bayer 
that the defendant’s second confession was voluntary and admissible 
because the six month span of time between confessions was a suffi-
cient length of time to restore the mindset of the defendant to its “pre-
confession” condition.125  The Court explained that any confession 
given after the defendant’s “pre-confession” mental state had been 
restored would have been given of the defendant’s own volition, not 
as a result of any coercive actions on the part of authorities, and 
would thus be admissible.126 
The idea that a defendant should be restored to his “pre-
confession” condition is evident in the case Wong Sun v. United 
States.127  Here, the United States Supreme Court found that a confes-
sion given by the defendant several days after his initial arrest was 
admissible because the confession was not gained by exploiting the 
illegal arrest but rather was given by the defendant out of his own vo-
lition.128  In this case, the Court opined that due to the lengthy break 
in time, the connection of the confession to the wrongful interroga-
 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 281-82 (stating that the defendants, all African-American men, were either hung 
until near death or whipped before their confessions were obtained). 
121 Id. at 287. 
122 Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
123 Id. at 540. 
124 Id. at 540-41. 
125 Id. at 541 
126 Id. at 540-41. 
127 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
128 Id. at 491. 
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tion had “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of the first 
illegal arrest and questioning.129 
Regarding the limitations of Miranda warnings, the United 
States Supreme Court case New York v. Quarles130 created an excep-
tion to the practice that a Miranda warning must be administered.131  
In Quarles, the Court held that Miranda warnings may be omitted by 
an official before questioning a suspect if public safety is an immedi-
ate concern.132  In this case, the Court found that the officer’s query 
as to the location of the defendant’s hidden gun was appropriate even 
if formal Miranda warnings had not yet been administered because 
there was still of an appreciable threat posed to the public via the un-
known whereabouts of a firearm.133 
A further limitation to Miranda was set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois.134  Here, the Court rea-
soned that Miranda warnings alone do not expunge the adverse ef-
fects of an illegal arrest and any subsequent confessions made.135  In 
Brown, the Court found that when Miranda warnings had been ad-
ministered but the voluntariness of a confession was still in doubt, 
then it was appropriate to assess the totality of the circumstances to 
determine admissibility on a case-by-case basis.136  Here, the Court 
placed the burden of demonstrating voluntariness on the prosecu-
tion.137  In this case, the Court found that the defendant’s two confes-
sions were results of his wrongful arrest, and because only two hours 
had elapsed between his arrest and his first confession, the Court 
ruled that there had not been enough time to expunge the adverse ef-
fects of the illegal arrest from his mind before he gave his second 
confession.138 
The federal approach to determining the admissibility of a de-
fendant’s confession could thus be summarized as an assessment of 
 
129 Id.; see also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (explaining that 
where the connection between the confession and the wrongful act of obtaining it have be-
come “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” then any confession given thereafter would be 
deemed voluntarily given). 
130 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
131 Id. at 653. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 652-53. 
134 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
135 Id. at 603. 
136 Id. at 603-04. 
137 Id. at 604. 
138 Id. at 604-05. 
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the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession’s origins 
taking specific notice of the presence of any physical coercion pre-
sent in the interrogation and the mindset of the defendant while mak-
ing said confession.  If the defendant is found to still be under the in-
fluence of a wrongful arrest or questioning, then his confession will 
be suppressed as being involuntary.  This approach ensures that no 
defendant is compelled to give evidence against himself and is in 
harmony with the Fifth Amendment. 
VII. NEW YORK STATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The New York precedent leading up to Guilford is nearly 
identical to federal precedent and can be highlighted through several 
New York Court of Appeals decisions and Appellate Division cases.  
In the state law cognate of Brown v. Mississippi, the New York Court 
of Appeals case People v. Weiner139 held that confessions need to be 
made voluntarily if they are to be considered admissible.140  In this 
case, the defendant was threatened with physical force by police of-
ficers until a confession was obtained.141  In Weiner, the court rea-
soned that the defendant’s confession was made only out of fear of 
physical threats and, thus, suppressed the confession as being invol-
untary.142 
In another case, People v. Yukl,143 the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the mindset of the defendant and decided that Miranda rights 
could be waived voluntarily and, thus, any confession made thereaf-
ter was a voluntary confession.144  In Yukl, the defendant was in-
formed of his Miranda rights and began to cooperate with police in 
the investigation of a murder.145  Through the defendant’s coopera-
tion, the police were able to determine that he was the killer.146  The 
court explained that a reasonable person would have recognized that 
he was in custody at the time; therefore, through his cooperation, the 
 
139 161 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1928). 
140 Id. at 443. 
141 Id. at 442 (stating that the defendant was physically assaulted and threatened by offic-
ers before giving his confession). 
142 Id. at 442-43. 
143 256 N.E.2d 172 (N.Y. 1969). 
144 Id. at 174, 175. 
145 Id. at 172-73. 
146 Id. at 173. 
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defendant waived his Miranda rights.147 
Like the federal courts, the New York courts follow the ra-
tionale that the “taint” of illegal arrest or illegal questioning may be 
purged from the mind of the defendant, thus, allowing a voluntary 
confession to be given.  Illustrating this point is the Appellate Divi-
sion, Fourth Department case People v. Strong.148  In Strong, the 
court found in favor of the People after the defendant made his con-
fession four hours after his illegal arrest and after two sets of Miran-
da warnings had been given.149  The court reasoned that there was a 
sufficient amount of time between his illegal arrest and his confession 
to “reset” his mind and render his confession voluntary; thus, the 
statements were not “obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest.”150 
A similar decision to Strong is the Appellate Division, Second 
Department case People v. Alexander.151  Here, in contrast to the de-
cision in Guilford, the court found that eleven hours was a sufficient 
amount of time to purge the effects of the wrongful interrogation 
from the mind of the defendant.152  This decision was based on the 
fact that the defendant had been given his Miranda warnings in a 
timely manner and had waived those rights prior to questioning.153  
More importantly, the confession was given by the defendant to a 
new detective about an unrelated subject eleven hours after his initial 
arrest and after he had been shown surveillance video of himself 
committing the crime.154 
On the other hand, the Second Department found in People v. 
Clark155 that the defendant’s confession was gained by means of ex-
ploiting his illegal arrest and, therefore, the confession given should 
be suppressed.156  In Clark, the defendant was arrested without prob-
able cause, interrogated, and given a polygraph test, which he 
failed.157  After being informed of the results of the polygraph test, 
 
147 Id. at 175. 
148 794 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2005). 
149 Id. at 258. 
150 Id. 
151 882 N.Y.S.2d 473 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009). 
152 Id. at 475. 
153 Id. at 473. 
154 Id. at 475. 
155 540 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1989). 
156 Id. at 329-30. 
157 Id. at 329. 
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the defendant confessed.158  The court found that because it was un-
clear what procedures were used to elicit the confession, then the 
confession must have been given involuntarily; the People failed to 
meet their burden and demonstrate that the confession was given vol-
untarily.159  Another case supporting this point is People v. Pitsley.160  
Here, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department explained that be-
cause there was no significant intervening event between the wrong-
ful arrest and the defendant’s confession, the confession should be 
excluded.161 
Thus, the state approach to determining the admissibility of a 
confession mirrors the federal approach.  The New York approach 
prohibits the admission of physically coerced confessions and takes 
into account the totality of circumstances surrounding the making of 
the confession.  The court will analyze these factors in order to en-
sure that the confession was not given while the defendant was under 
the influence of wrongful questioning or wrongful arrest thus ensur-
ing that the confession was given voluntarily. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The court in Guilford correctly held that the defendant’s con-
fession, on the morning of March 23, 2007, was a coerced confession 
that was made involuntarily as a result of wrongful interrogation.162  
The totality of the circumstances has shown that the defendant’s eight 
hour break in Guilford was insufficient to remove the influence of his 
wrongful interrogation from his mind.163  The court’s rejection of the 
defendant’s confession comports with the spirit of the Fifth Amend-
ment and the self-incrimination clause.  In coming to its decision, the 
court did not articulate a clear rule regarding when a defendant is re-
stored to his former state of mind.  In the future, the court could de-
termine the admissibility of a confession based not on a voluntariness 
standard but rather on an objective penalty standard.164  With that in 
mind, each defendant’s case and circumstances are different.  An in-
 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 330. 
160 391 N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1977). 
161 Id. at 258. 
162 Guilford, 991 N.E.2d at 210. 
163 Id. 
164 Godsey, supra note 102, at 515-16. 
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flexible rule would most likely prejudice those defendants who need 
more time to readjust themselves from the effects of the interroga-
tion.  There is much at stake in confusing voluntary and involuntary 
admissions and great care must be taken in differentiating them.  By 
accepting involuntary admissions, coerced by force or trickery, the 
court not only jeopardizes the liberty of the defendant but compro-
mises the integrity of the justice system as a whole.  For that reason, 
the standard for defining voluntariness with regard to confessions is 
necessarily high, and justice is better served through the current trend 
of assessing issues of voluntariness on a case-to-case basis. 
Joseph A. Iemma
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